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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The radio schedule published in the New York Times on March 6, 1935, 
listed twelve “outstanding events” for that day, including two musical concerts, 
a speech about the “next war,” and a talk by Raymond Pitcairn, national 
chairman of a group called the Sentinels of the Republic, about the ongoing 
“Pink Slip Publicity Strike.”1 The “pink slip” was the pink-colored form each 
income taxpayer had to submit along with his income-tax return, pursuant to 
the Revenue Act of 1934. The form contained certain tax information that 
would then become public record, even if the taxpayer had no actual tax 
liability. The “strike” was part of a campaign orchestrated by Pitcairn to force 
Congress—by dint of public opinion—to repeal this provision. Viewed as an 
exercise in futility when it began, the campaign quickly gained momentum and 
soon achieved ultimate success—repeal. 
Although the pink-slip provision died quickly, its passage and repeal remain 
relevant for anyone interested in the media, politics, the New Deal, income 
taxation, or simply a good tale. At its most basic level it is a fascinating story full 
of razzle-dazzle, a dash of sexism, and a large dose of kidnapping anxiety. 
Studying the repeal campaign more deeply, however, offers more-substantive 
rewards. It provides perspective on the recurrent tension between the right to 
know and the right to privacy. Indeed, amidst the current financial crisis, 
publicity of tax information once again has gained some attention. Former IRS 
Commissioner Mark Everson recently stated, for example, that increasing 
transparency by publicizing corporate tax returns would more quickly reduce 
the public’s economic fears than regulation would.2 The story of the pink-slip 
repeal also deepens our knowledge of conservative groups during the early New 
Deal, especially regarding federal taxation. Most of all, it enriches our 
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 1. Today on the Radio, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1935, at 14. 
 2. Mark W. Everson, A Reform Tool: Tax Returns, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2008, at A15. 
KORNHAUSER 9/4/2010 11:10:03 AM 
124 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:123 
understanding of the use of public relations to influence public opinion for 
political ends in the field of taxation as well as elsewhere. In doing so, it 
presents an early example of the still-current political phenomenon by which a 
small but active and well-financed group influences legislation through the 
manipulation of public opinion. 
The story of the pink-slip repeal contradicts a common criticism of the 
income tax—that it leads to a tyranny of the minority who “soak the rich.” Very 
few Americans paid income taxes at that time. Nevertheless, the repeal 
campaign’s expert use of public relations, the media, and rhetorical appeals to 
the “common man” harnessed the hopes and fears of everyday people to 
support a policy that not only did not affect them, but that helped the rich who 
were subject to the tax. Today, the scope (and expense) of lobbying campaigns 
far exceed those of the 1935 repeal campaign, but the basic outlines of that 
campaign still hold true: a small, well-organized group, rhetorical appeals to the 
common man—to both his fears and his patriotism—and extensive use of the 
media to broadcast those appeals and encourage activism by average people. 
The campaign against the estate tax, which culminated in 2001 with a 
(temporary) repeal, used a similar template. Although the tax affects a very 
small percentage of taxpayers, the campaign, funded largely by a small number 
of very wealthy families, focused on the effect that the estate tax has on average 
Americans, and especially on quintessential American institutions—family 
farms and small businesses—the vast majority of whom never pay any estate 
tax.3 
II 
A SHORT HISTORY OF TAX PUBLICITY IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE 
CIVIL WAR TO 1934 
In 1934, a law requiring the publication of income-tax information 
(publicity) was neither a novel idea nor an unprecedented practice in the 
United States. It was, however, unusual. In fact, in the history of the federal 
income tax, it had occurred only twice previously: during the Civil War and in 
1924; additionally, the 1909, income-based corporate excise tax contained a 
publicity provision. Organized campaigns were instrumental in effecting the 
quick repeal of both the 1909 and 1924 provisions. Even if congressmen had 
personally opposed publicity, voting to repeal it so quickly after enactment 
might have been politically difficult, especially given the scandals that had 
provoked their passage. In 1909 and 1924, however, concerted effort converted 
existing opposition to publicity into a groundswell of “natural” outrage large 
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enough to provide a legitimate justification for repeal. An even stronger repeal 
campaign in 1935 would lead to a repeal of the 1934 law. 
The establishments of income-tax publicity and the income tax itself were 
practically simultaneous. Although the first effective income tax in 1862 was 
ambiguous on the issue, the 1864 Act explicitly provided for public inspection of 
lists of the names of taxpayers and the amount of taxes they owed. Regulations 
issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue stated that such publication would 
provide the “amplest opportunity” to detect frauds and omissions.4 Despite 
opposition to this publicity provision, it was not repealed until 1870 when the 
tax itself was repealed. Since then, confidentiality of income-tax information has 
been the rule and publicity the exception. 
The next instance of tax publicity, in 1909, illustrates a recurrent pattern: 
publicity occurs only when financial scandals create enough concern to override 
the deep-seated aversion to it. Although technically not an income tax, the 
Corporate Excise Tax Act of 1909 imposed a tax based on a corporation’s 
income.5 The Act required full publicity of tax returns. Many people, including 
President Taft, believed that the publicity provision would solve the widespread 
practice of stock-watering, which overstated a corporation’s capitalization by 
inflating the value of property contributed by incorporators. Relying on these 
erroneous financial data, investors bought stock in these thinly capitalized 
corporations. As a result, these innocent stockholders could end up personally 
liable to corporate creditors for the full, inflated amount. Public access to 
corporate tax returns, proponents argued, would eliminate the problem by 
providing investors with the accurate financial information necessary to make 
wise investments.6 The groundbreaking Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934 followed this philosophy as well. 
Corporations and trade associations waged a concerted attack on the 
publicity provisions, peppering Congress and the Treasury with letters and 
petitions; association members (especially small businesses and businessmen) 
did so as well, using form letters provided by groups such as the National 
Association of Manufacturers.7 Their objections mirrored the Civil War 
objections in both theme and rhetoric, emphasizing the intrusive and “un-
American” nature of the law. Although the law affected only corporations, its 
 
 4. Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 223, 228 (1864); George S. Boutwell, Regulations for the 
Assessment and Collection of the Special Income Tax Upon Income of 1863, in A MANUAL OF THE 
DIRECT AND EXCISE TAX SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 258, 259 (4th ed. 1864). For a history of 
income-tax publicity, see HOWARD M. ZARITSKY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR 
CONGRESS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TAX RETURN CONFIDENTIALITY: SECTION 6103 OF THE 
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 AND ITS PREDECESSORS (1974). 
 5. Ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (1909). 
 6. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 
IND. L.J. 53, 99–100 (1990). On the general problems of stock-watering and publicity as the solution, 
see id. at 72–81. 
 7. See 45 CONG. REC. 1467 (1910) (Rep. Longworth reading example of a circular from the 
Illinois Manufacturers’ Association urging its members to write their congressmen and to contribute 
money to the antipublicity campaign); Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 115–18. 
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opponents not only complained that publicity would reveal business secrets, but 
also highlighted publicity’s prurient appeal to the lower classes of society and 
people’s baser natures.8 Opponents also continued the un-American theme. 
Publicity, they claimed, contradicted the “thing that has made America great 
beyond all things else . . . the freedom of the individual [which included a 
corporation] from undue governmental control.”9 
The opposition developed two additional themes that would become 
increasingly important in the twenties and thirties. First, it stressed that 
publicity would be dangerous for businesses—especially small ones—it would 
divulge trade secrets to competitors.10 Second, opponents made a broader point: 
publicity was an illegal exercise of federal power. In 1909 they argued 
specifically that by attempting to regulate corporations, the federal government 
intruded upon states’ rights.11 In 1910 Congress repealed the mandatory 
disclosure provision and returned to the previous policy of giving the President 
discretion to disclose tax information, which he exercised only for public 
corporations.12 
Although the Senate had passed a full tax-publicity bill in 1921,13 Congress 
did not enact another publicity provision until 1924—amidst congressional 
investigations of the Teapot Dome Scandal and the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue.14 The 1924 Revenue Act provided a very limited amount of publicity: 
only the names and addresses of taxpayers and the amount of tax paid were 
open for inspection; the Act also provided for publication of refund amounts.15 
 
 8. 45 CONG. REC. 4136 (1910) (Rep. Gillett: “[Publicity] would only gratify the curiosity or malice 
or ill will of others . . . .”). Opponents also objected to the publicity provisions as allowing unwarranted 
regulation by the federal government. See Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 116–17. During the Civil War, 
opponents claimed that publicity was “obnoxious” because it “traded upon by newsmongers and the 
scandal-loving portion of the public.” ZARITSKY, supra note 4, at 6–8. 
 9. 45 CONG. REC. 4140 (1910) (Rep. Sherley stating that corporations should be treated like 
individuals and be free from undue governmental control). During the Civil War, opponents claimed 
that publicity turned Americans into spies. ZARITSKY, supra note 4, at 6–8. 
 10. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 125–26. 
 11. See, e.g., Rush of Objections to Taft Tax Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1909, at 1 (stating that 
objection to tax focused on the publicity feature’s attempt to supervise corporations); Editorial, Mr. 
Taft’s Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1909, at 6 (stating that the primary purpose of the tax was its 
publicity feature because if the purpose were to raise revenue, a stamp tax would accomplish it). See 
also Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 115–16. In later years, more-general illegality arguments would be 
made. 
 12. Ch. 297, 36 Stat. 494 (1910). Secretary McVeagh did not favor publicity. ROY BLAKEY & 
GLADYS BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 57 (1940). See Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 125–32. 
For an analysis of the amendment and its enforcement, see Exec. Order, T.D. 1665, 13 Treas. Dec. Int. 
Rev. 117 (1910); Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 130–31. 
 13. In 1921 the Senate passed bills to open both income-tax returns and refund claims to public 
inspection. 65 CONG. REC. 7692 (1921); 61 CONG. REC. 7365 (1921). 
 14. See, e.g., Walsh Will Fight for Tax Publicity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1924, at 3 (Sen. Walsh 
asserting that publicity would help constrain tax administrators). 
 15. Revenue Act of 1924, § 257(b), 43 Stat. 293 (1924). The Senate, however, had passed a full 
publicity bill. 65 CONG. REC. 7692 (1924); Full Tax Publicity Voted by Senate, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1924, 
at 1. 
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Although some people (including President Coolidge) opposed publicity from 
the outset,16 the provision did not gain much public attention until newspapers 
published lists of taxpayers and the amount of taxes they owed. Individual 
taxpayers, businesses, and commercial organizations such as Chambers of 
Commerce passed resolutions and sent letters to congressmen; there were even 
calls for taxpayer meetings to protest.17 At that point, however, much of the 
commentary did not focus on publicity of tax information generally, but only on 
whether the publicity provision, which required that the tax lists be open to 
public inspection, permitted newspapers to publish the lists—a question the 
Supreme Court answered affirmatively in 1925.18 
Much of the opposition followed the lines of earlier publicity battles. 
Opponents’ surprisingly tame and generally framed complaints asserted that 
publicity was “inquisitorial,” “un-American,”19 and “a gross and unwarranted 
violation of [a taxpayer’s] privacy and his rights.”20 Some stressed the adverse 
effect of publicity on business, especially small business, while others claimed it 
would decrease revenues.21 Though vague on detail, the complaints did not lack 
rhetorical flourish. Congressman Hawes’ oration on the House floor was typical 
in its appeal to the average man, national myth, and democracy. Publicity, he 
asserted, 
violates every idea of Anglo-Saxon fair play. [Applause.] It destroys the old theory of 
the right of castle. A man is entitled to some privacy. . . . 
. . . 
 
 16. See, e.g., For Income-Tax “Snooping,” LITERARY DIG., Mar. 8, 1924, at 12 (citing negative 
excerpts from various papers and stating that “[m]any editorial writers wax[ed] sarcastic over the 
proposal[] while others ignore[d] it”); President Opposes New Tax Clauses, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1924, at 
1–2 (“[V]iolent protests have poured in on Senators from every quarter, not alone from corporations 
and business men, but from the individual taxpayer who regards this as a gross and unwarranted 
violation of his privacy and his rights.”). 
 17. See, e.g., Taxpayers to Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1924, at E16 (Union League Club of 
Brooklyn announcing plan to call a meeting of residents of Long Island to protest publicity as being 
“destructive of privacy and a denial of the fundamental right of citizens to keep their own affairs to 
themselves”); Watson Wants Repeal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1924, at 18 (reporting that Representative 
Watson’s “mail [had] been flooded with protests against the [publicity] section, coming from 
individuals, corporations and organizations of business men all over Pennsylvania . . . including the 
Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce”). 
 18. United States v. Dickey, 278 U.S. 378 (1925); Income Tax Returns Made Public; J.D. 
Rockefeller Jr. Paid $7,435,169; Ford Family and Company Pay $19,000,000, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1924, 
at 1; Nation-wide Chaos on Tax Publicity; Collectors Are Confused by Rulings; More Payments Made 
Public Here, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1924, at 1. 
 19. For Income-Tax “Snooping,” supra note 16, at 12. 
 20. Full Tax Publicity Voted by Senate, supra note 15, at 2. 
 21. Uncle Sam Fears Paul Pry, INDEPENDENT, Nov. 8, 1924, at 353; see also Tax Bill Conferees 
Clash over Changes, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1924, at 1 (reporting Hoover’s statement that publicity would 
hurt small business and open “the door to fraud”); To Act on Tax Publicity, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1925, 
at 5 (noting that “unscrupulous competitors” would use the information and cause harm to businesses). 
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The frontiersmen who crossed the ocean and built their cabins in this land put doors 
and windows in their homes in order that they might sleep and rise and dress in 
privacy.22 
Newspapers similarly lambasted the provision. Publicity, one declared, 
“illustrates the tendency . . . to Prussianize our Government and surround the 
individual with all sorts of tyrannies, both large and small. . . . The spirit that 
lived in Adams and in . . . patriots who refused to bend the knee to autocracy, 
still lives in America to-day.”23 The papers increasingly used sarcasm to fight 
publicity. Articles and editorials spoke of “Mrs. Grundy’s” and “Paul Pry’s” 
prurient interest in other people’s tax information.24 The Washington Post, 
noting that tax publicity was “the most effective step toward Government 
control of private affairs since the Volstead law” (prohibition), cautioned that 
progressives’ next step might be to lobby Congress for legislation requiring all 
married couples to have at least four children to fulfill their “moral 
obligation . . . to be fruitful.”25 The Chicago Tribune commented, “Probably 
we’ll all be ready presently for a law prohibiting the manufacture, sale, 
distribution and use of window blinds of more than one-half of 1 per cent 
opaqueness.”26 
Sarcasm was not the only rhetorical device that sharpened in the campaign 
against the 1924 publicity provision. Opponents triggered both patriotism and 
political anxiety by labeling publicity un-American and linking it to socialism 
and communism.27 They also made more-pointed references to the harmful ways 
in which the less respectable elements of society would use publicity. The 
magazine the Independent proclaimed that publicity not only fanned class 
hatred among the “ill-to-do” but “[p]artners are checking up on each other; 
husband and wife are on the fiscal trails of their mates, alimony hunters are 
running wild, and ‘sucker lists’ of the wealthy are being prepared by those who 
 
 22. 65 CONG. REC. 2959 (1924). See 65 CONG. REC. 2952–59 (1924) for much of the House debate. 
For the Senate debate, see 65 CONG. REC. 7682–89 (1924). 
 23. For Income-Tax “Snooping,” supra note 16, at 12 (quoting Springfield Union). 
 24. E.g., Mrs. Grundy’s Taxes, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 12, 1924, at 262; Uncle Sam Fears Paul Pry, 
supra note 21, at 353. 
 25. Press Comment on Publicity for Income Tax Returns, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1924, at 3 
(reprinting Private Affairs Obsolete from the Washington Post). 
 26. Press Comment on Tax Publicity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1924, at 25 (reprinting Oh, See the Pretty 
Gold Fish from the Chicago Tribune). 
 27. Publicity supporters noted that claims that a bill was an “assault” on private property leading to 
Bolshevism were made whenever “organized capital” opposed a proposal. Walsh Will Fight for Tax 
Publicity, supra note 14, at 3. 
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have something to sell.”28 The New York Times noted similarly that publicity 
“might become a direct encouragement to grafting and blackmail.”29 
This rhetoric ignored two important facts. First, most people did not care 
about publicity because they did not have to file an income-tax return. Second, 
the salaries of many of those who did have to file already were public 
information.30 Nevertheless, in 1926 Congress amended the publicity provision 
so that only the names and addresses of taxpayers would be available to the 
public. 
In 1934 financial scandal and fraud once again became the impetus for tax 
publicity. Spurred by evidence of widespread tax evasion revealed during the 
Senate hearings on the 1929 stock-market crash, the Revenue Act of 1934 
closed many legal tax loopholes.31 Some congressmen, such as Senator La 
Follette Jr. argued that this was not enough. Publicity of tax information, they 
claimed, was needed to prevent the abuses from happening again. Using 
arguments that they had used in the 1920s, publicity proponents argued that 
publicity would keep both taxpayers and tax officials honest and in so doing 
increase tax revenues:32 publicity allowed citizens to detect cheating by other 
 
 28. Uncle Sam Fears Paul Pry, supra note 21, at 353; accord Income Tax Books Here Now 
Guarded, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1924, at 1; Names of Wealthy on Non-Taxable List, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 
1925, at 1. When the Supreme Court later upheld the right of newspapers to publish tax information, an 
editorial in the Independent observed that there was great “joy among the Paul Prys, the compilers of 
‘Sucker Lists,’ the gossips, the have-not’s, the parasites, and the informers.” Paul Pry Wins His Case, 
INDEPENDENT, June 6, 1925, at 625. 
 29. Washington Is at Sea, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1924, at 3. 
 30. Mrs. Grundy’s Taxes, supra note 24, at 262 (noting that salaries of government employees were 
published as were hourly or weekly rates of pay). 
 31. Revenue Act of 1934, § 277, 48 Stat. 680 (1934). 
 32. STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 
S. REP. NO. 72-1455, at 321–22 (1934). Even pro-business newspapers expressed outrage that wealthy 
people such as J.P. Morgan paid no income tax. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL 
STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE 
FINANCE 30–33 (1995). The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency undertook an investigation of 
the minimal income tax paid by the wealthy. E.g., 78 CONG. REC. 2506 (1934) (Rep. Doughton stating 
that congressional investigation and hearings disclosed tax evasions and avoidance that “astounded the 
entire country”); 77 CONG. REC. 4110 (1933) (Rep. McFarland stating that the Senate Investigating 
Committee Hearings showed “how easy it [was] for these big international bankers such as J.P. Morgan 
& Co. and their affiliates to evade the payment of their income taxes[,]” and that Congress should 
prevent tax evasion by “tightening up the loopholes in our income tax law that [made] these evasions 
possible” and “giving publicity to the income-tax returns to the end that the public generally may know 
more about the manipulations, maneuvers, and so forth, of these Wall Street pirates”). This theme 
continued through the passage and repeal of the publicity provision. 79 CONG. REC. 4445 (1935) (Sen. 
La Follette stating that secrecy of tax returns “[predisposed] to a maladministration of the law, to 
favoritism”); 79 CONG. REC. 4453 (1935) (Sen. Long referring to investigations and the need for 
publicity); 79 CONG. REC. 4517 (1935) (Sen. Couzens stating that investigations would not have been 
needed if returns were public); 79 CONG. REC. 4447, 4452 (1935) (statement of Sen. Long); 78 CONG. 
REC. 6545 (1934) (Sen. La Follette: “I am satisfied that we would never have known of the shocking 
evasions of taxes which were revealed by the investigations of the Senate Committee on Banking and 
Currency if those taxpayers had known that the returns which they were filing with the Government 
were going to be a matter of public record.”); id. at 6546 (Sen. La Follette stating that the “gross 
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taxpayers as well as favoritism played by tax officials.33 Moreover, paying taxes, 
they claimed, was a “public business” that gave every person the right to know 
that others were paying their fair share; confident that others were paying their 
fair share, taxpayers would be likely to do so as well.34 
The fury generated by the hearings enabled proponents to enact a full 
publicity-of-tax-returns provision in the Senate.35 It failed, however, to pass in 
the House. Ultimately, Congress enacted only a limited publicity feature in 
1934.36 New section 55(b) of the Revenue Act of 1934 required that all income 
taxpayers—not just individuals or corporations—submit a new form with their 
tax returns containing the taxpayer’s name, address, gross income, deductions, 
taxable income, and amount of tax liability. This form, known as the pink slip 
because it was printed on pink paper, would then become a public record open 
to inspection by anyone. Although this provision was not as broad as the 
publicity provision in the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, it was broader than the 
1924 provision and, unlike the 1909 Act, it applied to individuals. All taxpayers 
required to file returns had to fill in the pink slip, even if they owed no tax. 
Although many commentators initially believed that repeal was impossible, 
by 1935, the pink-slip law was abolished before it even went fully into effect. 
What caused this quick turnabout? Part of the reason surely lies in the basic 
aversion to publicity that makes tax confidentiality the rule and that led to the 
swift repeal of earlier publicity provisions. Yet repealing the pink-slip law 
presented formidable challenges: the law had been enacted less than a year 
previously, few people were affected by it, and outrage at the manipulations of 
the rich to avoid paying their taxes in the midst of the depression still ran high. 
 
favoritism and special privileges” accorded to the wealthy by tax officials would never have occurred if 
returns were public). 
 33. 79 CONG. REC. 4445 (1935) (Sen. La Follette stating that publicity prevents 
“maladministration” of law and “favoritism”); 78 CONG. REC. 6546 (1934) (Sen. La Follette stating that 
the “gross favoritism and special privileges” accorded the wealthy by tax officials and revealed at the 
hearings would never have occurred if returns were public). 
 34. See, e.g., 79 CONG. REC. 3397 (1935) (Rep. White stating that filing tax returns was public 
business); accord 79 CONG. REC. 4445, 4513 (1935) (statement of Sen. La Follette); 79 CONG. REC. 
4511 (1935) (statement of Sen. Norris); 79 CONG. REC. 4453 (1935) (statement of Sen. Long). On the 
argument that publicity would increase revenues because taxpayers would more willingly pay their own 
share, see, for example, 53 CONG. REC. 13292 (1916) (Sen. Husting stating that taxpayers were more 
willing to make a “true” return if they knew others were paying their fair share, and that people were 
less likely to evade tax when they knew other taxpayers could discover it); 53 CONG. REC. 13291 (1916) 
(Sen. Husting stating that taxpayers would be more apt to make a correct return if tax evasions “would 
be detected by their fellow citizens or by the authorities”). 
 35. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REC. 2521 (1935) (statement of Rep. Frear); 78 CONG. REC. 6553 (1934) 
(showing passage in the Senate); 78 CONG. REC. 6543 (1934) (statement of Sen. La Follette); 78 CONG. 
REC. 2600 (1924) (statement of Rep. Patman). The “fury” is indicated by debates in both houses. See, 
e.g., 78 CONG. REC. 2521 (1934) (statement of Rep. Frear); 78 CONG. REC. 2600 (1934) (statement of 
Rep. Patman); 78 CONG. REC. 7198 (1934) (statement of Sen. La Follette); 77 CONG. REC. 4110 (1933) 
(statement of Sen. McFarland); 77 CONG. REC. 4119 (1933) (statement of Rep. Shoemaker); 77 CONG. 
REC. 4122 (1933) (statement of Rep. Patman). 
 36. Revenue Act of 1934, § 55(b), 48 Stat. 680 (1934). 
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The key to the repeal’s success did not lie in the arguments against publicity, 
which were not new; rather, success was the product of both a massive 
campaign and current events. Orchestrated by one man named Raymond 
Pitcairn under the auspices of a small, conservative group, the Sentinels of the 
Republic, the intense campaign was a culmination of lessons learned from past 
political lobbying campaigns, especially the campaign to repeal prohibition. It 
made sophisticated use of the newest forms of media- and public-relations 
techniques to gain the attention and support of the masses. It made heavy use of 
traditional anti-publicity themes aimed at the common man—appealing to his 
patriotic sense of freedom and a democratic way of life, warning of invasions of 
privacy and preying on his fears of crime. Most importantly, the campaign 
adeptly focused on kidnapping, a crime to which the public was particularly 
attuned, given the Lindbergh baby kidnapping trial then in progress. 
III 
THE SENTINELS OF THE REPUBLIC AND RAYMOND PITCAIRN 
The Massachusetts-based Sentinels of the Republic are an early example of 
the politically active, conservative citizen groups formed in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Organized in Massachusetts, the Sentinels’ 1922 certificate of organization listed 
the following purposes: 
To maintain the fundamental principles of the American Constitution. 
To oppose further Federal encroachment upon the reserved rights of the states. 
To stop the growth of socialism. 
To prevent concentration of power in Washington. . . . 
To help preserve a free Republican form of government in the United States.37 
The Sentinels opposed laws it believed illegally expanded federal power and 
undermined the American form of government, such as prohibition, the 
Maternity and Infancy Care Act, and the Child Labor Amendment.38 By the 
early 1930s, the group distributed much of its information to legislators via 
personal letters and to the general public via letters to the editor and 
pamphlets. It also used radio broadcasts—a new and popular means for 
individuals and organizations to disseminate their messages—including those 
about taxation—across the nation.39 
Like most other conservative groups of the time, the Sentinels focused on 
the offending laws or programs themselves, but it also saw the connection 
 
 37. Certificate of Organization, Sentinels of the Republic Records, 1922–1944 (on file with Law 
and Contemporary Problems and the Williams College Archives and Special Collections, MC57 Series 
I, Volume I, Records: 1922–1944). 
 38. See Senate Investigation of Lobbying Activities, Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 165 and S. Res. 184 
Before a Special Comm. to Investigate Lobbying Activities, 74th Cong. 2047, 2049 (1936) [hereinafter 
Sibley Testimony] (testimony of David F. Sibley on April 17, 1936). 
 39. RUTH BRINDZE, NOT TO BE BROADCAST, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE RADIO 57–83 (1937). 
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between the programs it opposed and the taxes that funded them.40 In 1922, the 
year of the Sentinels’ founding, a member challenged the constitutionality of 
the Maternity and Infancy Care Act of 1921 (the Sheppard-Towner Act) on the 
grounds that revenues legally raised under the taxing power were being used for 
unconstitutional purposes. The Supreme Court dismissed the lawsuit, however, 
stating that taxpayers did not have standing.41 When the Sentinels discussed 
taxes more generally, it (like other conservative groups) focused on taxes such 
as the estate tax.42 
Despite all these activities, as 1935 began, the Sentinels of the Republic was 
a generally unknown organization. The appointment of Raymond Pitcairn as 
the Sentinels’ first national chair on January 26, 1935, radically—if briefly—
changed the organization and its status. His repeal campaign altered the group’s 
agenda and brought it to the attention of both Congress and the media. 
Pitcairn joined the Sentinels and began the repeal campaign for both 
political and personal reasons. Pitcairn was a wealthy lawyer, son of the 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company’s founder, director of several corporations, and 
an active member of the Swedenborgian religious community in Bryn Athyn, 
Pennsylvania. His political beliefs in individual freedom and limited 
government were grounded in his religious ones: beliefs in free will, 
individualism, and the responsibility to act to change laws that infringed upon 
freedom.43 He believed that individuals could influence congressional actions, 
especially with the aid of skillful public relations.44 
For many years, Pitcairn focused his political activities on repealing the 
Eighteenth Amendment (prohibition).45 He joined several of the many 
associations advocating repeal, including the powerful Association Against 
Prohibition Amendment (AAPA), of which he was a director.46 The AAPA’s 
 
 40. E.g., MAJ. GEN. JAMES G. HARBORD, SUGAR COATING YOUR TAXES 3 (1931) (arguing 
against the heavy level of taxation); SEN. HIRAM BINGHAM, TOO MUCH GOVERNMENT 2 (Oct. 4, 
1931) (stating that everyone, not just the wealthy, bore the burden of government spending because the 
wealthy shifted their taxes to the poor). 
 41. Brief of Appellant at 21, Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); accord 262 U.S. at 480 
(“[P]laintiff alleges that the effect of the statute will be to take her property, under the guise of 
taxation, without due process of law.”). The History of the Sentinels (on file with Law & Contemporary 
Problems and the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Papers of Alexander Lincoln, Box 1, Folder 
5, at 1). Ultimately, the Court dismissed the case, stating that taxpayers have no standing to challenge 
an appropriation unless they sustain “direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely . . . 
suffer in some indefinite way in common with people generally.” 262 U.S. at 488. 
 42. For example, both the Sentinels and the National Council of State Legislatures—also formed in 
the 1920s with similar goals—opposed the estate tax in the 1920s as an illegal exercise of federal power 
that infringed on states’ rights. 1 SENATE LOBBYING INVESTIGATIONS 600 (1929) (testimony of John 
Henry Kirby). 
 43. JENNIE GASKILL, BIOGRAPHY OF RAYMOND PITCAIRN 111, 119 (1977); see also the 
Swedenborgian Church of North America, http://www.swedenborg.org (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
 44. GASKILL, supra note 43, at 112. 
 45. Id. at 97, 111–19. 
 46. See, e.g., Sibley Testimony, supra note 38, at 2054; DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL 
PROHIBITION 154, 170–71 (2d ed. 2000); 4 WHO WAS WHO IN AMERICA (1961–1968), at 755 (1966). 
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repeal campaign was so large that one commentator stated, “For sheer power 
and professional efficiency the propaganda machine of the AAPA surpassed 
anything the country had ever seen.”47 The AAPA campaign—like the future 
publicity campaign—was run and funded by a small group of wealthy 
individuals who wanted limited government and disliked the income tax.48 
In his AAPA campaign, Pitcairn took advantage of the new publicity 
techniques and media, such as radio talks and flashes on movie screens. Some of 
his methods had been used in other recent political campaigns,49 but he also 
developed novel, attention-grabbing tactics that he would use again during the 
pink-slip–repeal campaign.50 His rhetoric—aimed at the masses—stressed, often 
melodramatically, two themes that he would emphasize again in his publicity 
repeal campaign: liberty and crime.51 
Once the Twenty-First Amendment repealing prohibition was ratified in 
December of 1933, the AAPA officially disbanded. Its success, however, 
encouraged many former members to redirect their newly freed time, energy, 
and money to other political issues. In August of 1934, a group of former 
AAPA members founded the American Liberty League to continue the 
defense of the Constitution and states’ rights, a mission previously carried on by 
the AAPA.52 Pitcairn considered joining the League but chose the Sentinels of 
 
 47. GEORGE WOLFSKILL, THE REVOLT OF THE CONSERVATIVES: A HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN LIBERTY LEAGUE 1934–1940, at 40 (1962); accord FLETCHER DOBYNS, THE AMAZING 
STORY OF REPEAL: AN EXPOSE OF THE POWER OF PROPAGANDA 15 (1940). 
 48. But see ROBERT F. BURK, THE CORPORATE STATE AND THE BROKER STATE: THE DU 
PONTS AND AMERICAN NATIONAL POLITICS, 1925–1940 ix (1990) (stating that the du Ponts wanted 
decentralized government only if they could not control a government). Some supported repeal in the 
hopes that revenues from liquor sales could eliminate the need for an income tax. DAVID M. 
KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929–1945, at 
62 (1999); Walter Lippmann, Today and Tomorrow: Repeal, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., June 2, 1933, at 19. 
 49. Aid Tax Reduction Week, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1924, at 11; General O’Ryan Heads Tax-Cut 
Committee, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1924, at 3; Open Week’s Drive for Tax Reduction, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 
1924, at 2 (describing actions by the Citizens’ National Committee to mobilize support for Mellon’s tax-
reduction plan). 
 50. He created, for example, a fake newspaper. GASKILL, supra note 43, at 117–18. 
 51. Letter under Raymond Pitcairn’s signature, as Temporary Chairman of the Republican 
Citizens Committee Against National Prohibition to Sen. La Guardia and Others (Mar. 21, 1932) (on 
file with Law & Contemporary Problems and the Hagley Library, Papers of Irenee du Pont, Accession 
#228, Series J, F261 Politics & Legislation 1930–40, Box 103, Folder 1932–1933) (quoting a letter in the 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle that bootleggers used “foul and illegitimate means” including 
murder). 
 52. See, e.g., WOLFSKILL, supra note 47, at 61–65; Letter from Captain Wm. H. Stayton to Former 
Members of the Executive Committee of AAPA (Oct. 11, 1934) (letter on AAPA letterhead stating 
that the American Liberty League worked “for the restoration and preservation of constitutional 
principles”) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems and the Hagley Library, Papers of Pierre du 
Pont, Accession # 771, Group 10, Series A, File 771, Box 1294); Letter from Pierre du Pont to Captain 
Wm. H. Stayton (Oct. 17, 1934) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems and the Hagley Library, 
Papers of Pierre  du Pont, Accession # 771, Group 10, Series A, File 771, Box 1294) (response to Mr. 
Stayton’s Oct. 11 letter). 
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the Republic instead;53 the Sentinels’ goals were similar to those of the League, 
but the group was generally not well known and about which Pitcairn himself 
seemed to know very little. 54 One reason for this decision might have been that 
the Sentinels—a small and relatively unknown group in need of money and 
members—offered more of an opportunity for him to exercise authority than 
did the League, which already had many powerful, wealthy members, including 
several du Ponts. Moreover, the Sentinels were willing to let Pitcairn campaign 
against income publicity, a battle he was already contemplating.55 
By January 31—just days after his appointment as the Sentinels’ national 
chair—Pitcairn had already drafted a pink-slip–repeal petition that he believed 
would bring attention and money to the organization.56 Although he brought in 
little new money other than his own, Pitcairn succeeded in attracting 
attention—not just for the campaign to repeal publicity but for the Sentinels as 
well.57 
IV 
THE CAMPAIGN TO REPEAL THE PINK SLIP 
Congressional opposition to income-tax publicity during the debate over the 
pink-slip provision echoed earlier anti-publicity arguments. Publicity, 
opponents claimed, harmed business and invaded privacy, often dangerously so. 
As in the 1920s, critics phrased their objections in sensational terms. 
Representative Treadway, for example, listed six reasons why tax publicity was 
“not within common sense or decency,” including three phrased in language 
that played to people’s fears and voyeurism.58 Publicity, he claimed, would lead 
to “[p]ersons with substantial incomes [being] hounded by bond and stock 
salesman, promoters—every kind of person—trying to get a commission selling 
stocks or bonds or wildcat schemes[,]” and “every man will be made a spy on 
 
 53. E.g., Letter from Raymond Pitcairn to Frank L. Peckham, Vice President of the Sentinels of 
the Republic (Feb. 5, 1935) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems and the Glencairn Museum 
Archives, Papers of Raymond & Mildred Pitcairn, Letter Press Book #15, at 876). 
 54. Indeed, the Sentinels had theretofore been so unknown that one newspaper incorrectly stated 
that the group had been formed just months earlier with the “primary” purpose of repealing the pink-
slip law. Felix Belair, Opposition Grows to Pink-Slip Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1935, at E10. 
 55. Letter from Raymond Pitcairn to Alexander Lincoln, President of the Sentinels of the Republic 
(Jan. 31, 1935) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems and the Glencairn Museum Archives, 
Papers of Raymond & Mildred Pitcairn, Letter Press Book #15, at 865). 
 56. Id. Most of the money brought in was Pitcairn’s, and most of that were loans and not 
contributions. Sibley Testimony, supra note 38, at 2051. 
 57. Belair, supra note 54. 
 58. 78 CONG. REC. 2602 (1934). 
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his neighbor and every employee a spy on his employer.”59 But the “greatest” 
evil of publicity, he warned, was that it provided blackmail opportunities.60 
Despite the lengthy congressional debate about the pink slip in 1934, the 
media did not focus on it. This lack of attention occurred in part because the 
media and the public—especially the business community—were focused on 
bigger legislative issues such as the introduction of the National Securities 
Exchange Bill in Congress. The lack of interest may also have resulted partly 
from the failure to appreciate that the provision turned the President’s formerly 
discretionary power to publicize into a compulsory mandate to do so. Whatever 
the reason, the resultant lack of attention may actually have facilitated the pink-
slip provision’s passage. 
In 1935, as the March 15 deadline for returns approached, opposition to the 
pink slip grew, but none of it seemed promising. On February 8, Representative 
Robert Bacon (R-NY) introduced a bill to repeal the pink slip, but prospects 
for its passage appeared dim; he could not even get it out of committee.61 Some 
commentators believed that Bacon was merely making a “political gesture” to 
his “ultra rich” Republican constituency.62 Columnist Arthur Krock opined that 
repeal would happen only if the administration pressured Congress to repeal 
the law.63 Although that pressure never materialized, Congress nevertheless 
repealed the provision less than two months later. Many contemporaries 
attributed this unexpected success to the efforts of Raymond Pitcairn, who had 
actually begun his Sentinels’ repeal campaign just before Bacon introduced his 
bill. 
A.  The Sentinels’ Campaign 
Pitcairn opened the Sentinels’ campaign on three fronts. First, he sent 
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau a petition from the Sentinels 
requesting that the pink-slip provision be repealed. Second, on February 6, 
1935, he sent the petition and a form letter under Sentinels letterhead to 12,000 
people urging them to complain about the pink slip and explaining exactly what 
steps they should take to do so. Third, he sent this form letter, the petition, and 
a short, more personal, cover letter (also on Sentinel letterhead) to several 
prominent individuals, some of whom he knew from the prohibition-repeal 
campaign, such as Irenee and Pierre du Pont.64 
 
 59. The other objections, also traditional, were more-sedately phrased. See id. (Rep. Treadway 
arguing that publicity revealed business secrets to competitors, enabled “tax experts” to pressure 
taxpayers to pay them for advice, and “seriously” interfered with those taxpayers whose business may 
not be profitable). 
 60. Id. 
 61. 79 CONG. REC. 2305 (1935). 
 62. Taxation: Back to Privacy, TIME, Apr. 15, 1935, at 15. 
 63. Arthur Krock, In Washington: Bacon Maintains Lone Fight on Tax “Pink Slip,” N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 21, 1935, at 18. 
 64. Letter from Captain Wm. H. Stayton to Former Members of Executive Committee of AAPA 
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Although Pitcairn opposed publicity on constitutional grounds—and 
occasionally stated so65—his initial arguments, which set the tone for the rest of 
the campaign, were aimed at the heart, not the head. With tax returns due in 
less than two months, Pitcairn needed to quickly create a groundswell of 
popular support that would pressure Congress to repeal the pink-slip provision. 
He needed to grab people’s attention and motivate them to political action. The 
way to do this, he knew, was through emotion, not reason. His opening actions 
were designed to accomplish these goals—and did. 
Sent out by the thousands, the form letter was a call to arms, setting out a 
plan of action that, with the petition, explained at an emotional—not legal—
level why people needed to fight for freedom and liberty against the un-
American pink slip. Pitcairn knew that a small number of people could sway 
legislation if they were vocal enough, but he had to convince others of that 
truth. Otherwise, Congress would not bother to act; and action—the more 
spectacular the better—was needed. Consequently, he began the letter by 
stating that repeal was possible “if even TWENTY-FIVE PER CENT of those 
citizens who resent it will express a demand for its repeal.”66 Minorities, he 
continued, “create news because they do daring things and act together. They 
get their way against larger numbers because they demand what they want and 
make a fuss about it. While the majority DO NOTHING. This is not 
Democracy!”67 Next, Pitcairn listed three specific steps each individual could 
take: write to newspaper editors, write to his congressmen, and, “Write across 
your pink slip: ‘I protest against this outrage to the right of privacy’; or just 
‘Sentinels protest.’ If you cannot afford the Five Dollar penalty fill in pink slip 
adding protest.”68 Pitcairn then continued with both a carrot and a stick, telling 
those who were not inclined to write letters regarding repeal that “you deserve 
the kind of laws you are getting, and your kind will be ruled by those who DO 
take interest in such matters.”69 Pitcairn ended by stating that the Sentinels of 
the Republic “are out in front fighting for you. Back us up and united we will 
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 66. Letter from Raymond Pitcairn (Feb. 6, 1935) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems and 
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win.”70 The petition described the dangers of publicity in a sensational manner. 
Publicity will “help undesirable mendicants, professional and other importunate 
collectors and unwelcome salespeople[]—scrupulous or otherwise[]—to prey 
upon citizens.”71 “Worse,” the petition continued, publicity “will serve the ends 
of competitors, business enemies, private enemies and blackmailers of citizens 
whose private means are thus publicly . . . exposed.”72 “Worst of all, enforce- 
ment of this law . . . will expose citizens to be victimized by CRIMINAL 
RACKETEERS, KIDNAPPERS AND GANGS OF THE UNDER- 
WORLD.”73 
Although Pitcairn’s letter stated that a fuss by the minority was how Father 
Coughlin ended up on the radio, he might as well have been talking about 
himself and the repeal campaign. In order for the “fuss” to be effective, Pitcairn 
transformed the campaign from one fought by and for the minority (income 
taxpayers) into a patriotic one fought for the majority—the common man. 
The initial February 6 mailing initiated the fuss. It generated many letters to 
Congress and publicity in the press, but Pitcairn did not stop there. He asked 
the Treasury for 100,000 copies of the pink slip (at the Sentinels’ expense). 
When Secretary Morgenthau refused, Pitcairn printed facsimiles of the form 
emblazoned with “I protest this outrageous invasion of my privacy” and 
distributed them in a mailing campaign even larger than the first, stating, “If 
you want the pink slip killed, sign this and mail it to Washington.”74 Later still, 
the Sentinels sent letters with the protest slogan printed on “bright green 
stickers,” urging recipients to paste them on their official pink slips. In all, the 
Sentinels distributed over 500,000 letters accompanied by both the sticker and 
the facsimile pink slip to thousands of businessmen, clubs, newspapers, and 
professional organizations (including those of lawyers, educators, publishers, 
and doctors).75 Numerous people followed the exhortations and participated in 
the protest.76 
Pitcairn later sent a telegram to Senator La Follette inviting him to debate 
the pink slip on the radio. Pitcairn made a big production when La Follette 
refused.77 After La Follette failed to respond to another telegram, Pitcairn 
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printed a transcript of what would have been the debate, but printing only his 
own comments and none for La Follette.78 
The campaign continued. Taxpayers, Pitcairn said, “awakened [by him, 
obviously] to the value of direct action, began a bit of polite picketing.”79 
“[P]retty girls” handed out stickers to taxpayers as they filed returns and “[i]n 
only one instance did a conscientious guard scent [sic] in the presence of these 
personable young women a menace to the domestic tranquility, and order them 
away.”80 Under Pitcairn’s tutelage, the pink slip was not just an invasion of 
privacy, but un-American; and not just un-American, but despotic: “We are 
living in America, not Russia. Not even a Mussolini or a Hitler imposed such 
indignity upon taxpayers.”81 
The Sentinels’ flashy actions and inflamed rhetoric, especially about 
kidnappers and gangsters, were designed to get attention, and they did. On 
February 8, the day after Pitcairn presented the petition to Morgenthau, the 
New York Times reported it in an article titled “Repeal of Income Publicity 
Demanded to Thwart ‘Mendicants’ and ‘Racketeers.’”82 His challenge to La 
Follette (and La Follette’s refusal to debate) also made the news, as did his 
plans to picket the Internal Revenue offices.83 The Times even reported the 
large number of letters that congressmen were receiving.84 Within weeks, much 
of the press was publishing editorials, cartoons, and letters to the editor on the 
topic.85 The press published a picture of the Speaker of the House, 
Representative Byrns, accepting a petition from Pitcairn, which Byrns displayed 
in the Speaker’s lobby.86 Fred Allen even mentioned the campaign on his 
popular radio show.87 
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Pitcairn did not neglect the more-mundane aspects of lobbying. As his 
February 6 letter showed, he understood the political power of letters to 
Congress. Accordingly, the Sentinels sent petitions to each congressman and to 
the President, posted petitions on club bulletin boards, and presented them to 
mayors.88 Congressmen received folders containing copies of the protest slip, 
petitions, news clippings, and other information, with a table of contents neatly 
typed on the front.89 Pitcairn understood, however, that the most effective 
pressure comes from individual constituents, not groups. Therefore, when it 
appeared that pro-publicity senators would pass another full-publicity bill, he 
sent letters to everyone on the Sentinel’s mailing list, again requesting them to 
write personal letters. He enclosed a sample protest, but asked each individual 
to send it on his own letterhead, under the individual’s personal signature, to 
show the senators that they should not be “obstructionists” “flout[ing] the will 
of the people.”90 
Pitcairn also addressed, in more-serious terms, the constitutional objections 
to publicity, especially after Bryns’s sympathetic acceptance of the repeal 
petition on February 20.91 The petition to President Roosevelt, for example, was 
considerably tamer than those sent to the Treasury and Congress. Although 
kidnapping and unfair competition were still mentioned, the petition to the 
President at least stated that publicity “invades the constitutional right of 
privacy.”92 The “Suggested Form of Resolution” that the Sentinels distributed to 
various organizations was more specific than the petitions: it charged that 
publicity “flagrantly [invaded] the right of privacy to which the citizen is entitled 
 
Republic Sub-series, File Sentinels #3) (“[W]hen the radio comedians take up the movement it must be 
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under the [F]ourth Amendment to the Constitution,” and that it violated the 
“right to be let alone” articulated by Justice Brandeis.93 
In general, however, Pitcairn’s campaign operated on a more visceral level 
in order to spur the public into action that would pressure Congress into 
repealing the provision. It is hard to convince people to act even when their 
personal interests are affected; it is even harder when people have no personal 
stake in the action, as was the case of income-tax publicity since the vast 
majority did not file income-tax returns. Moreover, since publicity applied only 
to the rich, it might be expected that in the midst of a depression and scandals 
about the wealthy avoiding income taxes, the masses might actually favor 
publicity. Pitcairn attempted not only to neutralize this antagonism, but to 
galvanize public support by reinforcing people’s natural preference for privacy. 
Therefore, he stressed the effect of publicity on the common man, not on 
businesses or the wealthy, and he characterized the law as applying to the 
average small businessman in order to garner sympathy. Most importantly, he 
gained attention through melodramatic actions such as protests and petitions 
and incited hostility through scare tactics enumerating the fearsome personal 
consequences of publicity, especially kidnapping. 
The threat of kidnapping for ransom—a relatively recent phenomenon—
had been used in the 1920s. The opponents of both tax publicity and 
prohibition, undoubtedly playing on fears stemming from the 1924 kidnapping 
and murder by Leopold and Loeb,94 had raised the threat of kidnapping in their 
campaigns.95 But in 1935, the pink-slip campaign brandished the menace far-
more forcefully and in a far-more-receptive atmosphere. 
Fear of kidnapping increased dramatically in the 1930s. Proponents of 
prohibition repeal had argued that prohibition encouraged bootleggers to 
kidnap their rivals and hold them for ransom. By 1931, with the end of 
prohibition in sight, many people—including media pundits—believed that 
bootleggers, deprived of their profits, would turn to kidnapping wealthy citizens 
for ransoms. By the early 1930s, the kidnapping “wave,” especially the apparent 
threat to wealthy businessmen, influenced state and federal elected officials to 
urge legislative action.96 The March 1932 kidnapping of the Lindbergh baby and 
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its intense public reaction finally pushed Congress into enacting a federal 
kidnapping law later that year.97 
The initial debates regarding the passage of a publicity feature in the 
Revenue Bill of 1934 reflecting this contemporary concern contained 
considerable rhetoric about crime—especially kidnapping. The 1935 repeal 
campaign found an even more receptive public for kidnapping rhetoric because 
of the contemporaneous trial of Bruno Hauptmann, the world’s “public enemy 
number 1,”98 for the Lindbergh baby kidnapping and murder.99 Taking 
advantage of the national—and worldwide—attention, the pink-slip-repeal 
campaign focused on kidnapping as a danger of publicity. Pitcairn used it; the 
press used it. So, too, did congressional opponents of publicity. 
B.  Congressional Opposition to the Pink Slip 
Congressional opponents of publicity echoed the themes of the Sentinels’ 
campaign. Representative Millard even used the exact wording of the Sentinels’ 
petition, claiming that publicity made people “victims of blackmail, kidnappers, 
racketeers, and other gangs of the underworld.”100 Privacy objections were 
sometimes based on the Fourth Amendment,101 but more frequently these 
objections—like the Sentinels’ campaign—were vague and simply stressed the 
un-American nature of the law. Senator Tydings, for example, stated that the 
“logical” extension of the pink slip was “to permit a neighbor to come in 
another man’s house to see if that man was violating the law. . . . If we keep on 
whittling away what few liberties we have there will not be any use of having 
any Government, because we will all be automatons, goose-stepping along.”102 
Women were mentioned as both potential victims and victimizers. Most 
frequently, congressional opponents claimed that publicity left women and 
children vulnerable to harassment by unscrupulous salesmen and to criminals.103 
Representative Kahn stated she “received dozens of letters from women who 
have their own incomes who are very fearful of this situation [kidnapping], 
because they fear their children may be kidnapped if the fact is divulged that 
they would be capable of paying ransom.”104 Women, however, might also be 
victimizers. Inquisitive spouses and nosy mothers-in-law would want their 
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allowances increased if they knew how much income the (male) taxpayer had, 
while widows would use tax information to search for a wealthy spouse.105 
Although the pink-slip provision applied to all types of taxpayers, 
congressional opponents of publicity—like Pitcairn—focused on individuals, 
especially individuals with “small” incomes. Congressmen stressed the letters 
they received from people of “modest means” and the dangers publicity posed 
to these “ordinary” people.106 According to congressmen opposed to publicity, 
the “small” taxpayer, “struggling to pay his taxes, to meet his mortgage and 
insurance payments, and to give his children an education . . . even more than 
the large [taxpayer], strenuously protests having his earnings paraded before 
the busybodies in his neighborhood . . . .”107 
In reality, however, very few people were subject to the publicity provision, 
which applied only to those required to file or pay income taxes. This group 
comprised less than ten percent of the population. Consequently, even the 
“small” taxpayer for whom the publicity opponents argued were relatively 
wealthy compared to the vast majority of Americans. Moreover, according to 
publicity proponents, all the letters from ordinary people were “inspired” by 
the rich who wanted a “government of the rich, by the rich, and for the rich.”108 
In their view, the Sentinels’ entire campaign was a “smokescreen” using the 
little taxpayer to “shield” the big taxpayers.109 
Although statements such as these were certainly political grandstanding, 
they also reflected real sentiments against the wealthy and big business. 
Consequently, repeal proponents needed to gain (or appear to gain) the 
support of ordinary people and to motivate them to write letters supporting 
repeal. Arguments based on constitutional principles or the lack of publicity’s 
effectiveness, no matter how true, would not gain the attention of the 
unaffected bulk of the population, let alone motivate them to actively support 
repeal. Appealing to their fear of crime and distaste of nosy neighbors would. 
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The ongoing, highly publicized trial of Bruno Hauptmann turned 
kidnapping into a trump card.110 Although publicity proponents knew the threat 
was “a great, big bogey man,”111 they could not overcome the frequent 
reiterations by congressmen, newspapers, and letter writers that publicity would 
encourage kidnapping. Senator Norris reminded opponents who objected to the 
inconvenience of publicity that publicity was “necessary” for the proper 
collection of taxes and that people put up with inconvenience in all areas of the 
government, including paying “more than a million dollars” for the Hauptmann 
trial.112 Within a month of Hauptmann’s conviction, however, the House voted 
overwhelmingly for repeal. 
The common-man rhetoric, combined with the kidnapping bogeyman, gave 
congressmen a legitimate reason to vote for repeal. Rather than fight to protect 
the interests of the rich (which often included themselves), congressmen 
claimed to oppose publicity because the small person opposed it, as evidenced 
by the many letters they had received. Although publicity proponents could 
argue that the campaign and the letters were directed by the wealthy and for the 
wealthy, they could not discount the hundreds of letters from allegedly ordinary 
people.113 These letters provided sufficient political cover for Congress to vote 
for repeal, regardless of its true motives. 
C.  The Administration’s Position 
Many repeal proponents had originally believed that repeal would occur 
only if President Roosevelt himself supported it.114 The reality, however, was the 
reverse. In light of the congressional and “popular” (however generated) 
support for repeal, only administration support could save tax publicity. This 
did not occur, and the pink-slip provision was repealed less than one year after 
its passage.115 
Neither President Roosevelt nor the Treasury ever offered an official 
position on publicity, despite intensive lobbying to persuade them to do so. In 
late February, Representatives Bacon and Kopplemann, who both had repeal 
measures before the House, wrote Secretary Morgenthau asking about his 
position on the matter. Although Morgenthau’s answer “avoided a clear 
expression for or against the measure,” both “understood” from his letter that 
he would not object to repeal.116 In March, just after the House passed the bill 
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repealing the pink-slip provision, Morgenthau again repeated that the Treasury 
was strictly neutral117—despite what others were saying. 
Roosevelt was in no position to support income-tax publicity, even if he 
desired it. By 1935, he was under attack from both the right and the left. On the 
right, the business community and conservatives were becoming increasingly 
antagonistic towards the New Deal, not just because they saw it as failing to 
deliver an economic recovery. Increasingly, they opposed his new programs as 
dangerously enlarging federal power, expanding federal spending, and 
therefore increasing the need for tax revenue.118 These were the very objections 
of people and groups such as Raymond Pitcairn, the Sentinels of the Republic, 
and the American Liberty League. On the left, Huey Long, whom many 
believed would run for President in 1936, was challenging Roosevelt on the 
Senate floor and in the media with his Share Our Wealth Campaign.119 Father 
Charles Coughlin’s popular radio show and the National Union for Social 
Justice also threatened to draw voters away from Roosevelt.120 
With his political power under siege from both sides, and with an ambitious 
program to reclaim it, Roosevelt would have been extremely unwise to take any 
position regarding tax publicity, a provision initiated by Congress. The pink slip 
aroused great hostility—especially from the right—but was too narrow to quiet 
attacks from the left. To do that, Roosevelt needed a broader legislative plan 
incorporating both tax and nontax aspects. Much of this program was in 
progress or being contemplated at the time of the pink-slip-repeal campaign. It 
included the Social Security Act, the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act, the 
Banking Act, the Wagner National Labor Relations Act, the Public Utility 
Holding Companies Act—and a new broad-based tax program to redistribute 
wealth (either symbolically or actually, depending on one’s view). On June 19, 
1935, shortly after repeal of the pink-slip provision, Roosevelt sent Congress a 
message proposing tax policies intended to decrease “an unjust concentration of 
wealth and economic power.”121 He recommended the enactment of inheritance 
and gift taxes, an increase on rates for taxpayers with more than one million 
dollars, a graduated corporate tax, and taxation of dividends received by 
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corporations, and he urged the elimination of “unnecessary” holding companies 
through taxation.122 
Income-tax publicity—unlike salary publicity, which Roosevelt continued to 
support for several more years123—was not merely symbolic. Salary publicity 
already existed to a large extent and applied only to corporate officers; by 
contrast, the pink slip would publicize financial information on a scale not seen 
since the Civil War. It would apply to all wealthy taxpayers and to all their 
income, not just the portion consisting of salary. The pink slip was a powder 
keg, in large part due to Pitcairn’s campaign, which had stirred up the middle 
class. Supporting it became too great a liability that produced too little gain. 
Although the President never officially came out against the pink slip, by the 
time the Senate passed its version of repeal on March 28, his approval was 




In less than three months the campaign to repeal the pink-slip income-tax-
publicity provision went from hopeless to triumphant. Many contemporaries 
attributed this success to Raymond Pitcairn and his Sentinels of the Republic’s 
campaign. The well-organized, well-funded, near-constant, often sensational 
campaign captured the attention of the press, the public, and Congress alike. Its 
showy tactics guaranteed media attention, and its rhetorical appeals to small 
taxpayers and to citizens’ fears of kidnapping motivated people to write to their 
congressmen. Words and actions together created a juggernaut. The New York 
Times called the campaign “probably the most ardent campaign for repeal of 
legislation since the drive to expunge the Eighteenth Amendment 
[prohibition],”126 which, in its time, had been viewed as the most powerful 
campaign.127 
The prohibition-repeal campaign and the campaign to repeal the pink-slip 
provision had much in common—participants, methodology, and ideology. 
Raymond Pitcairn, who played an active role in the former, orchestrated the 
latter, and without his leadership the pink-slip provision probably would not 
have been repealed. Methodologically, Pitcairn applied the lessons he had 
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learned in the prohibition-repeal campaign about the effectiveness of a well-
organized group, lobbying, and the power of the media in his Sentinels’ 
campaign to repeal the pink-slip. Ideologically, both campaigns reflected 
Pitcairn’s—and the Sentinels’—broader beliefs about individual rights and a 
limited federal government. Opponents of publicity, as was noted at the time, 
tended to object not just to publicity but generally to other federal programs 
such as the child-labor law and labor provisions of the National Recovery Act.128 
The pink-slip-repeal campaign, like the earlier prohibition-repeal campaign, 
was a powerful example of a relatively new phenomenon in politics (and 
advertising): the public-relations “counsel.”129 Traditional press and publicity 
agents managed the news so as to present their clients in the best possible light. 
The new public-relations man did more: he created the news and did so most 
effectively when the public believed that this “news” was impartial or 
disinterested.130 Raymond Pitcairn performed that function in the prohibition-
repeal campaign, and he did so again when he crafted the blitzkrieg that was the 
pink-slip-repeal campaign. 
Given that the pink slip applied to less than ten percent of the population, it 
is unlikely that natural but uncoordinated opposition would have gained the 
attention—let alone the support—of an indifferent, if not hostile, public. 
Without such support Congress was unlikely to repeal a provision it had 
enacted less than a year previously, especially since it was in response to public 
outrage at tax avoidance (and evasion) by wealthy individuals, as revealed by 
Senate investigations. Pitcairn, however, did not see these problems as 
insurmountable. He conducted an intense, flamboyant campaign that garnered 
the attention of both the public and Congress. 
Although many people perceived the partisan nature of Pitcairn’s actions, 
his tactics had a patina of objectivity. The petitions, strikes, and challenges to 
debate were news. Reported in papers and magazines, they gained more 
attention, and possibly more importance, than simple political posturing. Even 
if they were only politics and not news, they were done in the name of 
American democracy and the common man, not on behalf of just a privileged 
few. The campaign’s focus on individuals appealed to most people’s natural 
desire for privacy and to the American myth of the small businessman. 
Moreover, its constant emphasis on the personal dangers of publicity played to 
the fears of the common man. All these dangers—ranging from neighbors’ 
nosiness to more-serious concerns about solicitations by scam artists and the 
increased possibility of serious crimes such as blackmail—had a basis in reality. 
It was the constantly reiterated threat of kidnapping, however, that especially 
resonated with the public, focused as it already was on the trial of Bruno 
Hauptmann for the kidnapping and murder of the Lindbergh baby. 
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The hundreds of letters to congressmen and newspaper editors generated by 
Pitcairn’s strategies provided congressmen with the political cover they needed 
to vote for repeal. Perhaps President Roosevelt could have prevented the 
repeal by taking a stand in favor of continuing tax publicity. However, 
embroiled in broader battles against both the right and the left, he did not 
choose to expend political capital to do so. 
The repeal of the pink-slip less than one year after its passage meant that 
the effectiveness of income-tax-information publicity would not be tested. Yet, 
as Senator Norris dryly noted, some good had come from repealing the pink slip 
so quickly. Congress had “saved the country from the danger of kidnapping, 
and [has] now ended the kidnapping epidemic . . . .”131 Although the repeal 
campaign did not really end a kidnapping epidemic, its success undoubtedly 
helped ensure the continuance of another epidemic: the intense, highly 
organized use of the media, public relations, and rhetoric aimed at the common 
man in tax debates. 
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